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A method of evasion for linear differential games was established by 
Pontryagin in his work [6]. He considered there an evasion game gover- 
ned by a linear differential equation in R”, with a linear subspace M of R” 
as a terminal set. The game was assumed to end when the solution to the 
equation reached coincidence with the subspace M. The evader’s aim was 
to prevent the termination of the game. 
The method of evasion applied in [6] was based on the projection of the 
trajectory onto suitably chosen two-dimensional subspace L laying in the 
orthogonal complement of M in R” and, thereby, reduced the evasion 
problem to the problem of avoidance of the origin in the subspace L. (It 
was assumed, as usually in such a case, that dim M< IZ - 2.) Next, this 
method has been extended by many authors to the nonlinear case, see, e.g., 
c4, 7, 31. 
When more than one pursuer takes part in the game, some additional 
assumptions (like dim M< n - 3, as it was made in [3]) are necessary in 
order that Pontryagin’s method be applicable to such an evasion problem. 
There are, however, examples of games with several pursuers that do not 
satisfy these extra assumptions but, nevertheless, can be solved directly, see 
[2, 10, 11, 91. 
In this paper, we treat the problem of evasion for games with many pur- 
suers governed by kth order differential equations on the plane using a 
method closely related to the one given in [9]. This problem resembles the 
above-mentioned general evasion problems in spirit, and, simultaneously, 
allows us to incorporate many special examples. 
We limit ourselves here to considering the case of games described by 
kth order differential equations instead of more general situations, in which 
the operator V (see [7]) might be used, as the expense of being able to 
assert the possibility of “evasion along each trajectory” in these games. The 
assumption that the players move on the plane is not essential, we have 
made it for convenience. They could move in any space R”, with m 3 2. 
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1. PRELIMINARIES 
1.1. Notation 
In this paper we will use the following notation. For y1 E N and a, b E R” 
we denote by (a, b) the Euclidean scalar product of the vectors a, b and 
by !]a11 = (a, a) ‘j2 the norm of the vector a. The family of all non-empty 
compact subsets of R” will be denoted by comp( i3Y). For A, B c R”, b E R” 
and r>O we introduce the notation: 
2A denotes the family of all subsets of A, 
conv A denotes the closed, convex hull of the set A, 
Int A denotes the interior of A, 
K(ri, Y) = {b E: R”: (lb - all < r}, 
A-t-B=(a+b:a~A,bcB}. 
If z is an arbitrary function, dom z will denote the domain of this 
function. For t E [O, co), t* E (t, co) and for two given functions x, y defined 
at least on [t, t*) and [t*, co), respectively, we denote by x(t*)y the 
function z, with dom z= [t, co), such that z(s) =x(s), for SE [t, t*) and 
z(s)=y(s), for SE [t*, co). 
We shall consider measurable functions defined only on the intervals 
[t, co) and W, will denote the set of all such functions assuming values in 
the set W, where WC R” for some IZ E N. Finally, denote by ,U the Lebegue 
measure on R. 
1.2. Control Systems and Strategies 
As a first step in this section, we will present the dynamics of each player. 
This will serve to limit the class of trajectories that are possible. 
Let us fix two natural numbers m, 6~ and a set WE comp(R”). For any 
t > 0, a e,Rm, w: [t, ~3) + W measurable, let Z(r, a, w) denote a continuous 
mapping of [It, co) into R” such that Z( t, a, w)(t) = a and, if 
t*E(t, co)ndomw* and W*E Wf*, then 
Z(t, a, w(t*>w)=Z(t, a, w)(t*)Z(t*, Z(t, a, w)(t*), w*) 
(concatenation property). 
DEFINITION 1.1. The function Z is a control system in 08” with controls 
taking values in W. 
Throughout this paper the symbol X will stand for a control system of 
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the player E (evader) and the symbol Y (may be with subindices) for a con- 
trol system of the player P (pursuer). 
Now, we are going to define the sets of admissible strategies for each 
player, see also Definitions 1.1 and 1.2 of [9]. 
Suppose X is a control system in iRk with control taking values in 
UE comp([Wf), Y is such a system in IF!’ with controls taking values in 
VE comp(R’) and (to, a,, b,) E [O, co) x Rk x R’ is a fixed initial position. 
For each t > 0 define 8, to be the family of all sets ( ti: i E N } such that 
to = t, tj < tj, 1) for i~bJ, and such that tj+ co as i-+ oo. 
DEFINITION 1.2. A pair (e, #e) is said to be an evader’s strategy, if 
e: Y(t,, bo, V,) -+ U,, #e: Y(t,, b,, V,,) -+ 8,, and 
(ES) the equality ~~~~~~~~ =.FICtarjl implies [to, tj+Il n #e(y) = 
IIt03 tj+ l] n #e(J) and e(v)lCr,ti+,)=e(~)ICjo,rj+,), for all Y,JE Y(t,, b,, 6,) 
andjE N, where {ti: iE N} = #e(y). 
The set of all such strategies will be denoted by E(X, Y, a,, b,, to). 
The above definition means the following. Suppose that pursuer P has 
decided to use his trajectory y. Then, at each instant ti E #e(y), the evader 
takes his action based on the information about the past history of the 
evolution of P’s state, i.e., v(t), to < t 6 tj, and he continues to act in the 
chosen way up to time ti+ r. 
DEFINITION 1.3. We call p: U, --f V, a strategy of the player P when the 
following is true: 
(PS) for any t > to and U, JE U,, if u = ii almost everywhere on 
[to, t], then also p(u) =p(G) almost everywhere on the same interval. 
The set of all such strategies will be denoted by P( U, V, to). 
Remark 1.1. One can prove, analogously as it was done in the proof of 
Theorem 1 in [8], that the set of all outcomes resulting from arbitrary two 
strategies e E E(X, Y, a,, bo, to) and p E P( U, V, to) is non-empty and con- 
sists in a single pair of trajectories. 
For future use we now define a particular case of the evader’s strategy, 
the so-called s-strategy, see [IS]. Let us suppose that functions q and 6 are 
defined on [to, 00) x !Rk x 88’ and satisfy the conditions: q(t, a, b) E U, and 
6(t,a,b)>O, for any (t,a,b)s[to, co)xRkx!R’. 
PROPOSITION 1.1. Under the above assumptions, there exists a unique 
strategy (e, #e)EE(X, Y, a,, bo, to) such that for any YE Y(t,, b,, V,) and 
tjE (ti: ie IV} = #e(y) we have 
tj+1 = tj+ wj, 4tj1, Y(q) 
EVASION ALONG EACH TRAJECTORY 337 
and 
x(s) = x(fj, x(fj), 4tfj, x(tj), Y(tj)))(s), SE Ctj, tj+l 1 f 
where x = X(to, a,, e(y)). 
The proof of this theorem is also similar to the proof of Theorem 1 of 
C81* 
DEFINITION 1.4. The function e from Proposition I.1 will be denoted by 
[q, 6, a,,, bO, to] and we will say that the set #e(y) is determined by 
[q, 6, a, , b,, t,] and y, for y E Y(t,,, bO, V,). To make the notation simpler 
we will also write [q, 6, a,, bo, t,] G E(X, Y, a,, bo, r,). 
Finally, we introduce the two last definitions. Let a function 
cp: 5P x w-t [O, CXJ), numbers 4 8, TE (0, 00 ) and a trajectory 
x E X(to, a,, U,,) be given. 
DEFINITION 1.5. We say that a strategy (e, #e) EE(X, Y, aO, b,,, to) 
guarantees a result d in the game (X, Y, a,, b,,, to; q) on the interval, 
[to, to+ IIJ, within E of x, if 
(~1 to + Tf #e(v), 
(6) cpWfo, soy e(y))(f), v(t) > 4 
(c) IK(to9 a,, e(v))(t) - x(f)ll G E, 
for all YE Y(f,, b,, V,) and tE [to, to+ T]. 
DEF~ITION 1.6. The player E wins along each trajectory in the game 
(X, Y; cp), if for any (to, a,, b,) E [0, co) x Rk x R’, with q(uo, b,) > 0, and 
given E, T > 0, there exists d > 0 such that for each x E X( to, uO, U,,) one can 
find a strategy (e, #e) E E(X, Y, a,, b,, to) guaranteeing the result d in the 
game (X, Y, a,, bo, to; cp) on the interval [to, to+ T], within E of x. 
2. MAIN LEMMA 
The method of evasion we adopt in this paper is based on the folfowing, 
well-known fact from the theory of ordinary differential equations. Suppose 
UE comp( R”), f: Rk x U -+ I@ is continuous and Lipschitz with respect to 
the first variable. Then, for given (t, a) E [0, co) x R“ and E > 0, there exists 
6 > 0 such that for arbitrary two controls U, ii E U,, if u and ii agree on a set 
A c [f, t + T], with &A) 2 T- 6, then the corresponding trajectories x and 
P satisfy the estimation 11x(s) --Z(s)/ GE, for SE [t, t $ T], see, e.g., [S, 
proof of Theorem 9, p. 461. 
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Let us assume now that the above control u has been taken as a response 
to a given pursuer’s trajectory y, and that a next pursuer, moving along his 
trajectory y, wants to take part in the game. If the player E is able to main- 
tain a positive distance from the first pursuer, on the interval [t, t + T], 
avoiding the capture by the second one by varying the control u on a set 
A c [t, t + 2’1, with p(A) su lciently small, then he can also avoid both ff 
these pursuers on this interval. This is the main idea of our paper and 
Lemma 2.1 that will be proved in this section will serve to express it 
precisely. 
A certain technical difficulties occuring in its proof are caused by the fact 
that we have to construct a new control H, as a response to the pair of tra- 
jectories (r,J), so as to obtain a strategy satisfying condition (ES) of 
Definition 1.2. 
We thus reduce the problem of avoidance of many pursuers to an 
evasion problem with a single pursuer. 
For each t E [to, co) define X[to, a,; t] to be the set {a~ UP: there exists 
x E X(to, a,, U,,) for which x(t) = a}, i.e., the set of states that can be 
reached at time I by the evader starting in state a, at time to, and define 
Y[t,,, b,; t] in the similar way. 
Suppose that (eo, #e,) E E(X, Y, a,, bo, to), T, q, HE (0, co), q: Rk x 
I!%‘-+ [0, co) and M: [to, to + T) x Y(t,,, b,, V,) + 2RkX Iw’. The following are 
the hypotheses that will be made in this section: 
(Hl) There is [>O such that p((tE[t,,t,+T]:u(t)#il(t)})<[ 
implies IIX(t,, a,, u)(t)-X(to, ao, ii)(t)/] <r,t for all tE [to, to+ T] and all 
u, ii E u,. 
(H2) There are nondecreasing functions wq, w: [0, co ) --+ [0, co ), 
wJY), w(r) -+ 0 as Y -4 0, such that Iq(a, b) - ~(5, b”){ < wJ I/a - dJ/ + 
/lb--b”(J) for all a,ii~@ and b,b”ER’, and I/x(s)-x(t)11 + jly(s)-y(t)11 < 
w(ls- tl), for alI xeX(to, a,, U,), YE Y(to, b,, V,) and s, tE [to, to+ T]. 
(H3) to + TE #co(v), for Y E Y(to, boy V,). 
(H4) There is c > 0 such that tj+ 1 - tj > c, for all tj E #e,(v) n 
[to, to + T) and Y E Y(t,, bo, V,). 
(H5) If XPE Y(h, boy v,>, tjG #eo(y)n Cto, to+ T), and YI~~,,,~~ = 
Y”Ict,,,Gl, then M(t,y)=M(t,y”)=M(tj,y), for all 1s Ctj, tj+l). 
(H6) There are $3 > 0 and nondecreasing function 8: [O, co) -+ [0, co) 
with the following property: if y E Y( to, bo, V,), tj E # co(y) n [to, t, + T), 
tE Ctj, tj+l), UeXCto, uo; tI, b E YCto, bo; tI, Ila--(to, Q, e,(y))(t)ll 6 Q’, 
(a, b) E M(t, y), and cp(u, b) < @, then 
cpW(t, 4 eo(y))(sL 7(s)) 2 3s - t), 
forallJoY(t,b, V,)ands~[t,t+H]n[t~,t~+~]. 
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(H7) There exists a nondecreasing function (r*: LO, co) -+ [0, CC) 
such that for any h E (0, H] one can find q* > 0 satisfying the condition: if 
YE Y(to, boy vto), fj’ #e,(y)n [to, to+ 0, tE Iltj, tj-bl), UEX[to, Uo; tl, 
b E YCto, bo; tl, lb - X(to9 ao, eo(.W)ll 6 11, (a, 4 $ Wt, Y) and 
q(a, b) < q*, then there exist h* E (0, h] and u* E U, such that 
and 
q(X(t, a, u*)(s), j(s) 2 c*(s- t) for j E Y(t, b, V,) 
and, moreover, 
(X(t,a, u*)(t+h*),p(t+h*))EM(t+h*,y), 
for all 3 E Y(t, b, V,), provided t < ti+, -h*. 
In order to formulate the lemma we will also need the following 
notation. Let 
n*=min{nEN: Tdnc} and m*=min(mEN: T<ruaH}. 
For h = min(c/(2m*), [/( n*m*)} we take q* according to (H7), and we 
define 
@=min(& cp*> and j* =min(jf N: w,(w(T/(jm*))) <fj. 
Finally, for r 3 0, we set 
6(r) =ssTpH, max(o*(s), r - w,(w(s))> 
and 
CT(Y) = sen2H, max(B(s), 8(r)- w,(w(s))}. 
LEMMA 2.1. There exists a strategy (e, #e)eE(X, Y, uo, bo, to) such 
that, if y E Y(t,, bo, V,), x = X(to, a,, e(y)), and #e(y)= (ti: ie N>, then 
to + TE #e(y) 
tj+ 1 - ti >, c/(j*m*) for tj~ #e(y)n [to, to+ T), 
lb+) -X(t0, a,, e,(y)b)ll G 11 for SE [to, to+ T], 
dx(s), y(s)) Bmin dda,, b,)), f for SE Cto, t11, 
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W(tj), y(tj)) > min { 8(~/(2m*)), z -1 tje #@In (to, to+ Tl, 
q(x(s), y(s)) 3 d min 8(c/(2m*)), 3 
( i -11 
for SE [tl, to+ T]. 
ProoJ To prove this lemma we first find, for arbitrary y E Y(t,, b,, Y,,), 
the appropriate strategy [q(y), 6(y), a,, bo, to1 E E(X, Y, a,, b,, to). Let a 
trajectory y from the set Y(t,, b,, V,) be fixed. For t E [to, to + T), 
a~X[t,,, a,; t] and b E Y[t,, b,; t] satisfying the conditions: 
Ilu--X(top aov edv))(t)ll dr, (a, b)#Mt,y) and da, b) < 50 
we take sj E # eo( y) so as to ensure the inequalities sj < t < sj + 1, and denote 
by U*(t, a, b, y) and H*(& u, b, y) the sets of all U* E U, and, respectively, 
h* E (0, hj such that 
cpGf(t, 4 u*)(f), J(s)) 2 @*(s - t) 
and 
(X(t,a,u*)(t+h*),j(t+h*))EM(t+h*,y) 
for all 7 E Y( t, b, V,). 
for .sE [t, t+h*] 
n Csj3 Sj+ 113 
provided t < sj + r - h *, 
It is clear from (H7) that the sets U*(t, a, b, y) and H*(t, a, b, y) are 
non-empty. By the condition (ES) of Definition 1.2 and (H5), 
(t, a, b, y) E dom U* iff (t, a, b, y”) E dom U*, for all j E Y(t,, b,, V,) such 
that PI Ctatl = Y I c~~,~I. Furthermore, in that case, U*(t, a, b, y) = U*(t, a, b, 9) 
and H*(t, a, b, y) = H*(t, a, b, J). It follows from the above that there are 
selectors C? and I? with the properties: 
Ott, a, b, Y) E u*(t, a, b, Y), &t, a, b, Y) c H*(t, a, b, Y), 
Ott, a, b, Y) = @t, a, b, 3, li(t, a, b, y) = @(t, a, b, 91, 
for all jj E Y(t,, bo, Vi,), t E [to, to + T), a E lRk, and b E [w’ such that 
(6 a, b,Y)Edom u* and PICto,r7 =YI~~~,~~. 
We are now able to define the desired strategy. Let us fix 
(t, a, b) E [to, co) x Rk x R’ and choose sj E #e,(y) such that sj < t < sj+ I . 
We now set 
dY)(t, a, b) = Ott, a, b, vKs* >eo(y), 
where s*=min(t+@(t,a,b,y),si+I}, if t<t,-t-T, u6X[t,,a,;t], 
b E Ylto, bo; 11, lb - -J3to, a,, edy)II d rl, (a, b) $ Wt, y), and ~(a, b) < Cp, 
and we set 
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otherwise. The function 6(y) we will define in the following way. If 
cp(a, 6) > $5, then we put 
Q)(t, a, b) = min{sj+ 1 - 4 (sj+ 1 - sjW*m*)), 
if, conversely, cp(a, b) < Cp, we set 
6(y)(t,a,b)=min(sj.,-t,(sj+,-si)/m*). 
Next, define e(y) = Cdy), WY), aO, bO, to](y) and #e(y) to be the set 
determined by [q(y), d(y), a,, bO, to] and y. It is easy to see that 
dY)(S, 4 b) = 4ms, 4 b) and @Y)(S, 4 b) = ~(.F)(s, a, b), 
for all j E Y(t,,, b,,, V,), t E [to, co), and (s, a, b) E [to, t] x Rk x R’, 
whenever Plcr,,,ll =ylCrbtl. 
It follows from the definition of 6(y) that # eO( y) c # e( y ), thus (e, #e) 
satisfies the condition (ES) of Definition 1.2 and, moreover, to i- TE #e(y). 
From the definition of S(y) we conclude that tj+ 1 - tj > c/(j*m*), for 
tj” #e(y) n [to, to + T). 
Since, q(y)(t, a, b) # eO(y) implies cp(a, b) < 40, then, for s, E: #e,(y) n 
[to, to+ T) such that 
we have d(y)(t,u,b)=(s,+,-Q/m *. Therefore, there could be at most 
m* such points tj E #e(y) n [s,, s, + i) satisfying the inequality 
Because (8~ [tj, tj+l): e(y)t4#eo(y)(s)}~c [tjy tj+ Q(tj, -J$to, ~0, e(y))(tj), 
y(tj), y)], for the above tj’s, so 
which in turn implies, by the inequality 
T/b, + 1 -s,)< T/cdn* as 3,~ #eob)n [to, to+ T), 
that ~({s E [to, to + T]: e(y)(s) # e,(y)(s))) 6 n*m*h d g. Thus, it is clear 
from (Hl ) that the third condition of Lemma 2.1 holds. 
Now, we are going to estimate cp(X(t,, a,, e(y))(s), y(s)), for 
SE [to, t,+T]. Suppose cpta,, bo) < (P. Let #e(y)n [to, to-k T] = 
i to, t, 9.e.3 tj>, where tic ti+l, i=O, l,... j-1, and let x=X(tO,uo,e(y)). 
If (a,, bo) 4 Mto, Y), then e(y)(s) = (u* < to + h* 2 e,(y)i)(s), for 
SE [to, tl), where U* = @to, a,, b,, y) and h* = fi(to, uo, bb, y). By 
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(H7), cp(x(s), Y(S)) > a*(s - t), for s E [to, t, + h*], and by (H6), 
cp(x(s),~(s))>@-(&+h*)), for SE [to+h*, tI], because of the 
inequalities 
h* <h Q c/(2m*) < c/m* 6 t, - t,,. 
We thus obtain from (H2) that 
for SE [to, to + h*], and similarly, 
cP(X(S), Y(s)) 2 5E ,p$ r,7 max(B(z - (to + h*)), 
cp(x(to + h*), y(to + h*)) - w,W - (to + h”)))} 
2 rEyFH, max{~(~), z(cp(a0, boll - w,(w(z>>> 
= 4cp(ao, bo)), for SE [to + h*, tl]. 
The above considerations yield the inequality cp(x(s), y(s)) > a(p(a,, b,)) 
on the entire interval [to, tl]. 
If ~(a,, b,) < (p and (a,, b,)~M(t~, y), then taking account of the 
inequality g(r) <r, for r>O, we can establish the same estimation. 
Now, suppose &a,,, b,) > (p. In view of the formula 
where to is followed by .sl in the sequence #e,,(v), we have 
for SE [to, tl]. 
Finally, in all the cases: 
9+(s), u(s)) 2 min 
and, moreover, 
for SE [to, tll, 
p(x(tl), y(tl)) > min G(t, - (to + h*)), 8(4(2m*)), ; . 
-1 
In order to complete the proof, it suffices to repeat the above procedure 
for the next intervals [ tl , t2],... . 
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3. AVOIDANCE OF ONE PURSUER 
The purpose of this section is to obtain a sufficient condition for the 
existence of an evasion strategy in differential games with one pursuer, 
played over a finite time interval, where the evader is allowed to move in 
an a-neighbourhood of a given trajectory. Clearly, we must have some 
advantage at his disposal if the problem is to have a solution. It turns out 
that the standard assumption of the theory of evasion (formula (3.1) 
below) can assert this. 
Some previous results, e.g., Theorem 1 of [3J apply to games that we 
discuss here, but can assert only the possibility of avoidance of the pursuer. 
Let us fix UE comp( R”), VE comp(&), continuous functions 
f: R2 x U + R*, g: R2 x V + R2 and natural number k 3 1. We will assume 
that the functions f and g satisfy the conditions: 
lift4 u) -Ah u)ll d L*lla - WI, IId@ v)-g(h v)ll bLY:lla--bll, 
g(a, V) c Int convf(a, U), (3.1) 
for a, b E R2, u E U, and v E V, and we will define functions F and G by the 
formulas 
F(x, u) = (x2, x3 ,..., xk,f(xl, u)), 
G(x, v) = (x2, x3 ,..., xk, g(xl, u)), 
where x = (xl,..., xk) E RZk, .X~E R2, i = 1,2 ,..., k, u E U, and v E V. 
For t E [0, oz), a = (a’,..., ak) E R2k, b = (b” ,..., bk) E lW2k, where a’, b’E R’, 
i= 1,2 ,..., k, for measurable U: dom u -+ U, with t E dam U, and for 
measurabIe v: dom v -+ V, with t E dom v, we denote by X(t, a, U) the 
solution of the differential equation 
x’ = F(x, u), x(t) = a, 
defined on [t, co), and by Y(t, b, v) the solution of the equation 
Y’ = WY, 01, y(t) = b, 
defined also on [t, co). 
Now, choose arbitrary 10, no, a, = jai,..., a$ E (W2k. 
b. = (b;,..., b;) E ft2k, where a&, &E R2, for i= 1, 2 ,...) k. 
There are positive constants L, R such that 
lb(s) - aoIl d R, IIY(s) -boll G R, 
Ibe) - x(t)ll d 4s - 4, llAs)-v(t)ll <Us--4, 
and 
(3.2) 
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for all x~X(t,, ao, U,), YE Y(t,, bo, V,,), and S, TV [to, to+ Tf 11. 
Whence, making use of (3.1), one can find p E (0, R] and y E (0, I,] such 
that if a,&iE’, (IQ =l, (la-a,$(1 <R, SE& and (f(a,ti),6)= 
max,, u (f(a, u), S>, then 
(f(& 4 -g(b”, VI, a> 2 3, (3.3) 
for all ii, 6~ R2 satisfying the inequalities IJa-dj( <2p and Ija-ii/ 6 2~. 
3.1. FIRST STEP 
DEFINITION 3.1. A strategy (e, # e) E E(X, Y, a,, bo, to) is called C- 
extremal on the interval [to, to + T], if for any y E Y(t,, bo, V,) the follow- 
ing conditions hold: 
(a) to + TE #e(v), 
(b) c=t. ,+I-tjande(.~)(~)=c(~~)(t~)for all tjE#e(u)n[to, to+T) 
and s E [tj, tj+ 1). 
(c) for any tje #e(y) n [to, to + T) there is BE R2, llall = 1, such that 
<f(x’(tj), dy)(tj)), i> =fy; (f(x’(tj)2 U)Y 2>7 
where x = (xl,..., xk) = X(t0, a0, e(y))- 
Now, we set 
and 
r E (0, PI? H=min{l, p/(2L+y)} 
cp(~,~)=max{Il~‘-~‘ll, Ibk-bkll), 
for a = (a’,..., ak), b = (b’,..., bk) E IW2k, where a’, b’E Iw2, i = 1, 2 ,..., k. 
LEMMA 3.1. Zf (e,, #eo)~E(X, Y, a,, b,, to) is c-extremul on the inter- 
val [to, to+ T], with c Q H, then there exists a function M such that 
hypotheses (Hl),..., (H7) of Section 2 are satisfied. 
Proox Fix arbitrary CE (0, H] and a strategy (e,, #e,) E 
E(X, Y, a,, b,, to) which is c-extremal on the interval [to, to + T]. 
For ye Y(t,, b,, V,,) and te [to, to+ T) we take tje #co(y) to satisfy 
tj<t<tj,l and we define M(t, y) to be the set of all points 
(a, b) E IW2R x (W2k, a = (a’,..., uk), b = (b’,..., bk), ui, b’E [w2, i = 1, 2 ,..., k, such 
that llu.r - b’ll B p or such that there exists 6 E R2, taken for y and tj accor- 
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dingly to the condition (c) of Definition 3.1, satisfying the inequality 
(ak-bk,Ci)),O. 
A routine calculation employing the well-known Gronwall’s inequality 
(see again [S, proof of Theorem 9, p. 461) shows that hypothesis (Hl) is 
satisfied. Hypotheses (H2),..., (H5) are easy to verify. 
Verzjkation of Hypothesis (H6) 
We set $ =p and 6(t) = 2yt, for t 20. Let YE Y(t,, bO, V,), 
tiE#e,(y)n[t,,t,+T), tE:[t,i,tj+,), a=(a’,..., ak)EX[tO,a,;t], and 
b = (bl,..., bk) E Y[ to, b,; t] be such that 
lb - Xtto, a0, eo(y))tt) d r, (a, b) E Mtt, Y>, and da, b) < $. 
Since, (a, b) E M( t, y) and ]I a’ - b’ll < q(a, b) < 4 = p, so there exists BE R2, 
/dl,l = 1, for which ( ak - bk, 2) > 0 and 
(3.41 
where x0 = (x:,..., 4) = Jlto, soy eoW). 
Let us fix arbitrary v E V, and denote x = (xl,..., xk) = X( t, a, e,(y)) and 
J = (j’,..., jk) = Y( t, b, u). Then, 
llx'ts)-x!ittj>ll 6 Ilx’(s)-xltr)ll + llx’tt)-X~(t)ll + llx~(t)-X~(tj)ll 
~L(s-t)+rl+L(t-tj)~2LN~p~22p 
for SE [t, t+H], 
and 
llx’(s)-v”‘(s)ll <llxl(t)--y”‘(t)jl +2L(s- t)<c$ + 2LHd2p 
for SE [t, t-l-H]. 
Thus, by (3.3) and (3.4), we have 
<fWts)~ eo(Y)tti)) -g@(s), u(s)), 2) 2 2~ for SE [It, t+H], 
which implies that 
= <ak- bk, 6) + 
( 
js Ilf(x’tz), eoty)(ti)) -gW(t), v(z))& ;I 
I > 
2 0 + 2y(s - t) = d(s - t), for SE [t, 1+-H]. 
505/62/3-4 
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VeriJcation of Hypothesis (H7) 
Define, for each t > 0, o*(t) = yt, fix arbitrary h E (0, H] and take 
(p* = h(2L + y) exp( -2rc(2L + 7)/y). 
Let YE Y(to, b,, V,,), tjE #eob)n!Ito~ to+ T)~ t6 Ctj, tj+l), aE 
X[to, a,; t], and bE Y[to, bo; t] satisfy the conditions 
lb- X(tov soy eo(y))(t)ll G r, (a, b) # Nt, Y 1, and da, b) -=c 40*. 
Denote again x0 = (xh,..., x,“) = X(to, a,, e,(y)) and choose ri E R2, 
((Bl/ = 1, such that 
Clearly, ( ak - bk, 6) < 0, because )/a’-b’I( <q(a, b)<q*<p and 
(a, b) # Mt, Y). 
For s E [t, cc ) we denote by B(s) the closed convex hull of the set of all 
points b”~ R2 for which there exists a solution J = (J’,..., yk) of the differen- 
tial inclusion DYE G(J, V) + K(0, y) satisfying the conditions g=y”(s) and 
J(t) = b. Next, we denote by r the set of all points 6~ R2 laying on the 
shorter arc of the unit circle (2~ R*: /)ZI/ = l} between (ak- bk)/)lak- bk(j 
and 6, and satisfying the inequality (ak - bk, 6> < 0. Further, let A stand 
for the set of all points (s, a*) E [t, co) x (R’- B(s)) for which there is 
tl = a(s, a*) E r such that 
max (F-a*, CC) =O. 
g, B(S) 
Let us define B”: A --f 2@ and U”: A x R* --f U by the formulas: 
B*(s, a*) c B(s), 
(b* -a*, CI(S, a*)) = max (6 a*, CI(S, a*)) 
b.z B(s) 
b* E B*(s, a*), 
(f(k u*(s, a*, 3),+, a*)> = fy; UT& u), ds, a*)> 
for (s, a*, 2) E A x IX*, (3.5) 
for any (s, a*) E A. Let 7c = 41*/(2L + y). 
We are going to define an auxiliary trajectory x.+ E X( t, a, U,). Of course 
it should be x,(t) =a. Assume that X* has been defined on 
[t, t:] = [t, t + WC], for some v = 0, l,.... If (t:, x:(t:)) E A, we define X* to 
be the solution of the differential equation 
xi&) = w&)9 UYt,*, Xk*W), X:(e))), SE CC, t,*+11. 
EVASION ALONG EACH TRAJECTORY 347 
If, conversely, (I,*, x!+(t,?)) #A, then we extend x* on the entire interval 
[t,* ,CC ) in any admissible way. 
For SE [t, co) such that (s, X”,(S)) E A denote by v,(s) the element of 
B*(s, X”,(S)) for which 
IIY*b) - gh)ll = min 
b* E B*(s,xk,(s)) 
lib” -xk,M. 
Finally, for s E dom y.+ define e(s) to be the angle between ak- bk and 
4 -K&4. 
NOW, let us fix v* E N such that tf <t+ h and (t,*, Xk,(t,*)) CA, for 
v = 0, l,..., V* - 1. Let a trajectory J = (j’,..., jjk) from the definition of B(.) 
be fixed. 
Since l/x*(s)-x,(t,*)j\ fLu<p,fors~[t,*, t,*+l], andv=O, l,..., v*-I, 
and, moreover, 
ll”q+~‘(~)ll G llx’*(d-xl,(t)ll + Ilxl,(t)-.F’(t)ll + lly’(t)-y(s)tl 
GL(s-t)+q*+(L+y)(s-t)<(2L+y)H+pf2p 
for SE [t, t+H], 
so, by (3.5) and (3.3), 
<(x”,)W- Uk)W 447, xk*(tW> 
= we&), u*(t,*, x:m x’*(m)- W)‘(s), 4t:, e+K-))> 3,Y, 
for SE [tz, t:+ 1] and v =O, l,..., v* - 1. Therefore, 
Q(t,*+ 1) - O(t:) 2 sin[8(tZ+l) - O(t,*)l 
a FICII~~ - bkll + PL + y)(t,*+ I- t)l 
3 ylc/[rp” + (2L + y)(v -5 l)K] 
= YIC(2L + Y)(V + 211 
and X”,(S) $ B(s), for s E [t,*, t,*+ 1] and v = 0, l,..., v* - 1. Using the above 
inequality one can prove by induction that 
Y 
e(t:) a 2(2L + y) 
ln( 1 f v), for v = 0, l,..., v*. 
By the definition of A, it must be 0(t,*, _ 1) < n: which implies V*JC d h. Thus, 
there is the smallest v* E N such that V*K <h and (t$, xk,(t$))#A, 
whereas (t,*, xt(t:)) E A, for v = 0, l,..., v* - 1. We thus define 
h* = JCV* and u*(s)= u*ct,*, x:(tY*), x1*(tY*)) 
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for SE rtz, t,*+1) and v = 0, l)...) v* - 1. Then, (Xk,(t+h*)- 
y,(t+h*),&)>O and 
x”,(d #B(s) for SE [t, t+h*]. (3.6) 
By the above inequality, (~k,(t + h*) -yk(t + h*), a) > 0, for all 
y” = (J’,..., Jk)e Y(t, b, I’,), but it means that (x,(t+h*),J(t+h*))~ 
M(t+h*,y), whenever d<ti+r -h*. It follows from relation (3.6) that 
cp(x,(s), y(s)) > 11x$(s) -Jk(s)II B y(s - t) = a*@ - t), for JE Y(t, b, V,) and 
s E [t, t + h*], which completes the proof of Lemma 3.1. 
In order to prove the desired result we need two additional lemmas. 
Assume that q: R2k x R2k -+ U has the property: 
<F(G da, b)), b-a) =yl,aux <flu, ~1, b-a), 
for a = (a’,..., ak), b = (bl ,..., bk) E R2k, and 
for some ci E R2, with l/S/l = 1, whenever, uk = bk. 
For T>O, ieN, i&l, we define the constant function 
6T: [to, a) x R2k x R2k --, (0, co) by the formula 
hT( t, a, b) = T/i for (t, a, b)E [to, co)x R2k~ R2k. 
For (e, #~)EE(X, Y, a,, b,, to) and YE Y(t,, bO, V,,) we define 
eFq(v) = C4, aT, a,, a,, tolMtO, a,, e(y))) 
and #e:“(y) to be the set determined by the strategy [q, 6T, a,, a,, to] E 
E(X, X, a,, a,, to) and the trajectory X(to, a,, e(v)). 
LEMMA 3.2. For any T, E > 0 there is i, E N such that (ep, #eTq) E 
E(X, Y, a,, b,, to) is T/i-extremal on the interval [to, to+ T] and 
IMto, a,, ecsq(v))(t) -X(to, a,, e(v))(t)ll G 4 
for all (e, #e) EE(X, Y, a,, b,, to), i2 i, and t E [to, to + T]. 
ProoJ: The first part of this statement is obvious. The second one 
follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 of [ 11. 
LEMMA 3.3. If uh # bh, then for any T, E > 0 there is d > 0 such that for 
each x~X(t~, a,, U,) one can find a strategy (e, #e)eE(X, Y, a,, bo, to) 
guaranteeing the result d in the game (X, Y, uo, b,, to; cp) on the interval 
[to, to+ T], within e of x. 
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Proof Choose arbitrary x E X(to, a,, U,) and denote by (2, #C) the 
strategy from E(X, Y, a,, b,,, to) defined in the following way: 
and 
O(y) = u where x = X(t,,, a,, U) 
#i?(y)= {to, to+ T, t,+2T,...) for YE Y(t,, b,, v,). 
Let i, E N be taken for 42 accordingly to Lemma 3.2. Without loss of 
generality we may assume T/i, < H. Then, we take (eo, #e,) = (6?, #;,‘q). 
This strategy satsifies the assumptions of Lemma 3.1. Hence, by the 
inequality a: # b& there is d> 0 and (e, #e) E E(X, Y, a,, bO, to) such that 
and 
for y E Y(t,, bo, V,,) and s E [to, to -t T]. Moreover, it is not difficult to 
check that the constant d might be taken independently of x. The proof is 
complete. 
As a simple consequence we obtain 
THEOREM 3.1. If k = 1, the evader wins along each trajectory in the game 
w, Y; SD). 
3.2. CONTINUATION 
We now assume k> 1. For i = 1, 2 ,..., k, ts [to, to+ Tl, 
a = (al,..., ak) E X[to, a,; t], b = (b’,..., bk) E Y[to, b,; t], u E U,, and v E V,, 
we define zi( t, a, b, U, v) = xi - yi, where xi( yi) denotes the ith component of 
the trajectory X(t, a, u)( Y(t, b, v)), and, for s E [t, to + T+ 11, we set 
Zi(t,a, b)(s)=a’-b’+ (ai+'-bi+')(~-t)+ *.* +(d-bk) 
(s- t)k-’ 
(k-i)! ’ 
Let Zi denote the set of all functions zi( t, a, b, u, V) and Zi( t, a, b), where 
t E [to, to+ T], aE XCto, a,; t], be Y[to, b,; t], UE U,, and VE V,. 
Clearly, there is K> L such that /z(s)ll, I\z’(s)ll f2K for z EZ~, 
s~domzn[t,, t,+T+l], and i=2,3 ,..., k-l. 
For every i = 1,2,..., k we define the payoff functional ‘pi by the formula 
Soda, b) = max( II a’-b’(l, (la’-bill), 
where a = (a” ,..., ak), b = (b’,..., bk) E R2k. 
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LEMMA 3.4, Given iE (2, 3 )...) k}, ah#b& and a strategy 
(eo, de,) E E(X, Y, a,, bo, to) which guarantees a result d > 0 in the game 
(X, Y, a,, bo, to; cp,) on the interval [Jo, to + T], within 42 of a trajectory 
REX(~~,~,, U,). Then, there exist d>O and (e, #e)eE(X, Y,ao,bo, to) 
which guarantees the result d in the game (X, Y, a,, b,, to; qipl) on the 
interval [to, to + T], within E of 2. 
Following the pattern of the proof of Lemma 3.1 we will verify 
hypotheses (Hl),..., (H7). In order to do it we first define constants q, H 
and a suitable function M. 
Let rp=~~-~, q=min{p, d/2, &/2), H=min{l, q/(4K)}, and for 
YE Y(to, bo, V,) and t E [to, to + T), 
M(t,y)=((a,b)EjW2kx[W2k:lla1-bh’ll~~ 
or (a’-l-b’-‘, a’-b’)>O}. 
Obviously, hypotheses (Hl),..., (H5) are satisfied. 
Verification of hypothesis (H6) 
We set 4 = q and c?(t) = rp/2 for t 3 0. Let y E Y(t,, b,, V,,), 
tjE #e,(y)n [to, to+ T), tE [tj, tj+l), a= (a’,..., ak)EX[tO, a,; t], and 
b = (bl,..., bk) E Y[to, bo; t] satisfy the following conditions: 
lb--X(f0, aoT eoiY))(t)ll 6 rl, (a, b) E WC Y) and da, b) < 4. 
Let be x0 = (x;,..., 4) = X(to, a,, co(y)), x = (xi,-.., XV = x(t, a, co(y)) 
and j = (j’,..., jjk) E Y(t, b, V,). We then note that lla’ - b1 11 < CJJ = 1, 
whence (aipl--bi-l, a’-b’)>O and Ila’--b’J/ 3 llb’-x6(t)ll- IJxb(t)-aiJl > 
d - q > q. Thus, 
cp(x(s), j(s)) 2 lb- Ys) -Yi- ‘(s)ll 
2 (x’-l(s)-Fi-‘(s), a’-b’)(ila’- bill)-’ 
a”-b’) +jS (x’(z)-J’(r), a’-b’)dz) (Jlai--b’)-l 
t 1 
30+ s ’ (a’-b’+x’(z)-j’(r)-(a’-b”),a’-b’)(l(a’-bill)-’dz * 
> (/a’- bill - L(s - t))(s - t) > (q - LH)(s - t) z q(s - t)/2 = &(s - t) 
forsE[t,t+H]. 
Verification of Hypothesis (H7) 
Let h E (0, HJ be arbitrarily chosen. Then, we take h^> 0 such that 
r/ - 2Kh^= (q + 2Kh^)(l - (y/(2K))2)“2 
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and define 
‘p* = min(q, $h*/(6K)j, 
where h* = min{h, & q2/(24K2)}. 
We need a few lemmas. 
bmMA 3.5. Given tE [to, to+ T], a=(~‘,..., ak)~X[to, a,; t], b= 
(b’,..., b% Y[Ih,, b,; 11, UE u,, and vc V, such that {]a’- bill > q and 
‘Pi- l(a, b) < cp*. Then, (z(t + h*), z’(t + h*)) > 0, where z denotes either 
zi- ,(f, a, b, u, v) or ~~-~(t, a, b). 
Proof Observing that z(t) = ui- 1 -b’--’ and z’(t) = ai-- b’, we obtain 
<z(s), z’(s) >
= l z(t)+z’(t)(s- t)+ Jo j’;“(r)drdS,;‘(t)+j~z~(i)d-) f t t 




- 2K7s - t)Z - 2K2(s - t)3 
b -2Kq* + (q* - 2Kq*)(s - t) - 8K2(s - t)‘> -2Kq* + 2qz(s - t)/3 
- 8K*(s - t)2 = -2Kq7” + (2v2/3 - 8K7s - t))(s - t) 
> -2Kq*+$(s-t)/3 
for SE [f, t + h*]. Whence, 
(z(t+h*),z’(t+h*))> -2Kq*+$h*/330. 
LEMMA 3.6. Suppose z E: Zi_ 1, tE.[t,,t,+T+l], [t,t,+T+l]c 
dom z and llz( t)ll > n/2. Then, 
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ProojI In view of the formula 
z(s) -z(t) = z’(t)(s - t) + j-’ j+z”(~) dz dS 
f f 
we have 
for s E dom z, 
and 
IW) -4th z’(t))1 2 llz’wll*l~- 4 -m- 4211z’wl 
Ilzb) --z(t)ll IW(f)ll G IlWl121~ - 4 + f+ - ~)*ll~‘(~)ll 
for s E dom z. Therefore, 
l(zb) -44 z’(t)>l 
> Ilz’(t)ll - as - 4 
’ Ilz’(t)ll + 4s - 4 c Ilz’W Is - 4 + m - o* Ilz’(tNl 1 
>d2-&-tl 
, r,2 + Kls _ t, IId4 -4Oll Ilz’Wll for s E dam 2. 
LEMMA 3.7. Given tE [to, to+ T], a=(~‘,..., a”)EX[t,, a,; t], b= 
(b’,..., bk) E Y[to, b,; t], z’i E U, u E V,, and ci E I??*, with l/fill = 1, such that 
l+b’ll <p and (f(al, 3 2) = FEa,atr (f(a’, u), 6). 
Then (z(s) -z”(s), Li) > y/K jlz(s) - Z(s)/1 for s E [t, t + H], where 
Z=Zi-l(t, U, b, 6, V) and Z=F’(t, a, b). 
ProoJ It is easy to see that 
z(s)--(s)=S~S~‘+~-~S~’ [f(x’(~), Li)-g(y’(z), v(z))] dzdsl...dsl+k-i 
f f I 
for s E [t, t, + T+ 11. Using (3.3) and observing that 
Ilf(x’(s), a) -g(v’(s), @))ll = Ilzh(t, a, b, 6, v)(s)11 d 2K 
for almost all SE [t, to+ T+ 11, we obtain 
and 
(s-f)*+k-- 
lb(s)-z”(s)II ,<x (2+k-i)! for SE [t, t+H], 
(3.7) 
which implies the required inequality. 
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LEMMA 3.8. Suppose that li, a’, a, E R2, 11611 = 1, a’- f-0, {a’, 6) =O, 




ProoJ: We can prove this lemma using simple trigonometric 
calculations. Now, let 
o*(t)=3y’(Jw+JKT)-’ (2t;kk$ for t&O. 
Let Y E Y(to, boy v,), tjE #e,(y)n [to, to-+ T), tE Ctj, tj+l), az 
(a’,..., ak) E X[to, a,; t], b = (b’,..., bk) E Y[to, b,; t] satisfy the following 
conditions: 
lla - Wto, ~0, eo(y))(t)ll d vl,(a, b) 6 M(t, Y), and (Pi- ,(a, b) < cp*. 
Of course, jlal -b’lJ>,d-VZq, jla’--blll<rp*dq, and (aisl--biW1, 
a’- b’) <O. It follows from Lemma 3.5 that there is t* E Et, t+ h*] for 
which (Z(t*), z”‘(t*)) = 0, where .? = ,Fi- l(t, a, b). We now take ci E R2, with 
j/8(/ = 1, such that (8, z”‘(t*)) =0 and (S, z”(P)> = /(z”(t*)ll. It is not hard 
to check that IIZ”‘(t*)ll Z q/2. Thus, by Lemma 3.6, the definition of h”, and 
the inequality h* < &, we have 
I<i-(s)--(t*), Z’(t*)>l >/(1-(~~/(2K))~)l’~ IIZ”(s)--Z(t*)(l ll2’(t*)ll (3.8) 
for SE [t, t* + h*] n [t, to+ I’+ 11. Let U* E U satisfy the condition 
Ma’, u*h 6) =yfy <f(a”, u), 2) 
and let v E V, and s E [t, t + h*] be fixed. According to Lemma 3.7 and for- 
mula (3.X), the assumptions of Lemma 3.8 are satisfied for al= z”‘(t*), 
a, = z”(t*), a* = z(s) -z”(s), and ii = z”(s), where z(s) = zi- l(t, a, b, u*, D)(S). 
Hence, by (3.7), we obtain 
Ib(s)Il = llz”(s) f (z(s) - 3s)ll 
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It is clear from the above that 
+W(t, a, u*)(s), Y(t, h u)(s)) > lIz( > c*(s - t) for SE [t, t+h*]. 
From Lemma 3.5 we conclude that 
Mt, a, u*)(t+h*), Y(t, b, v)(t+h*))~M(t+h*,y), 
proving Lemma 3.4. 
In view of Theorem 3.1, we have just proved by induction the following 
result. 
THEOREM 3.2. The player E wins along each trajectory in the game 
(X r; cp‘). 
Remark 3.1. Using Theorem 1 of [3], one could only state that E has 
an evasion strategy in the above game. 
4. AVOIDANCE OF MANY PURSUERS 
In this section we give our main result. Let the control system X be the 
same as in Section 3. Suppose that VE comp(Rb), gj: R2 x V -+ R2 are con- 
tinuous, Lipschitz in the first variable and satisfy the condition 
gj(a, vi) c Int convf(a, U) 
for all a E R2, v E V, and j = 1, 2 ,..., n. 
We define control systems Yj analogously as it was done in Section 3 
and we fix arbitrary to E [0, co), T > 0, a, = (uh ,..., a$) E [W2k, bi, = 
lb; I...> bi) E R2k such that a: # b,fO for j= 1, 2 ,..., n. 
For in { 1, 2,..., n}, t 3 0, (a, bl ,..., bi) E [WZkCi+ ‘I, where aE [W2k, bjE [W2k, 
j= 1,2 ,..., i, and for (ol ,..., vi) E Vi x . . . x c we set 
(Y, x *-- X Yi)(t, bl,..., bi, ~1,..., Vi) = Y~(t, b,, ~1) X ... X Y,(t, bi, Vi) 
and 
$j(a, b1 ,..., b,)=min(Ila’- b,‘)l:j= 1, 2 ,..., i}. 
From Theorem 3.2 we co&de that for any E > 0 there exists d, > 0 such 
that for each fe X(to, a,, U,,) one can find a strategy 
(e,, #e,)EE(X, Y,, a,, b,,, to) which guarantees the result d, in the game 
K y,7 a07 b,,, to; til) on the interval [to, to + T], within F/n of Z. Owing 
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to Lemma 3.2, we can also assume that (e,, #e,) is c-extremal on the 
interval [to, t, + T], with c sufficiently small. Now, we may define a 
strategy (e,, #~,)EE(X, Y, x Y,, aO, blo, bzO, to) by the formulas 
eO(yIy yd = el(yIh #eo(~Iy~2)= #eI(yI) 
for (Y~,Y~)E(Y~ x Y2)(t0, ho, bO, Vex Co). 
Following the considerations of Section 3 (Lemma 3.1) we can prove 
that there exist d,>O and a strategy (e2, #e.JcE(X, Y, x Y,, 
a,, blo, bzo, to) which guarantees the result d2 in the game (X, Y, x Y,, 
a,, b,,,, bzO, to; $.J on the interval [to, to + T], within 2&/n of i. 
Repeating this procedure step by step we arrive at the following theorem. 
THEOREM 4.1. The player E wins along each trajectory in the game 
(X, Y, x *.. x Y,; I),). 
Remark 4.1. For k = 1 we obtain games similar to those ones 
investigated in [ 121. 
Remark 4.2. Assume that U, VE comp(R2), vj c Int conv U f(a, u) = u 
and gi(a, v) = v for a E [w2, u E CT, u E vj, and j = 1,2 ,..., n. If control systems 
X, Yj, and payoff functionals r,kj, j= 1, 2,..., n, are defined as previously, 
then E wins along each trajectory in the game (X, Y1 x ... x Y,; I/,,). 
The case of k = 2 has been investigated in [ 111. 
In the case of k > 3, even the existence of an evasion strategy does not 
follow from the previous results. 
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